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Abstract. A k-anonymous broadcast can be implemented using a small
group of dining cryptographers to first share the message, followed by
a flooding phase started by group members. Members have little incen-
tive to forward the message in a timely manner, as forwarding incurs
costs, or they may even profit from keeping the message. In worst case,
this leaves the true originator as the only sender, rendering the dining-
cryptographers phase useless and compromising their privacy. We present
a novel approach using a modified dining-cryptographers protocol to dis-
tributed shares of an (n, k)-Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Finally, all
group members broadcast their received share through the network, al-
lowing any recipient of k shares to reconstruct the message, enforcing
anonymity. If less than k group members broadcast their shares, the
message cannot be decoded thus preventing privacy breaches for the orig-
inator. Our system provides (n− |attackers|)-anonymity for up to k − 1
attackers and has little performance impact on dissemination. We show
these results in a security analysis and performance evaluation based on a
proof-of-concept prototype. Throughput rates between 10 and 100 kB/s
are enough for many real applications with high privacy requirements,
e.g., financial blockchain system.
Keywords: Network Protocol, Privacy Protocol, Dining Cryptographers,
Secret Sharing, Peer-to-Peer Networking
1 Introduction
In recent years, the general public has become more interested in privacy issues,
even leading to strong privacy-protection regulation, e.g., the general data pro-
tection regulation (GDPR) of the European Union. This increased interest led to
a rekindling of privacy research, especially for financially-sensitive information.
Several cryptocurrencies attempt to provide unlinkable transactions for their
users [8, 9]. Unfortunately, many of these approaches neglected the underlying
network’s privacy and focused on the public information accessible through the
blockchain. Researchers showed that transactions can still be deanonymized
through the network [2, 7]. This network deanonymization led to even better
identification, as internet-protocol (IP) addresses can be matched to real-world
identities compared to public keys.
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Various projects tackled this issue of network identification. Monero [9] ap-
plies Kovri1, a garlic-based routing scheme. In previous work, we proposed a pro-
tocol based on dining-cryptographers (DC) groups to realize a broadcast protocol
with strong privacy guarantees [11]. Chaum’s dining-cryptographers groups [3]
have been used by other state-of-the-art protocols such as Dissent [4, 13] and
k-anonymous groups [1].
Although DC groups provide very strong privacy, their efficient usage for
broadcast communication requires additional protocols layered on top of the DC
network, e.g., a flood-and-prune broadcast. This creates additional risks, as non-
cooperating participants in the layered protocol might force the true originator
to step up and jeopardize their anonymity. In previous systems, timeouts were
used to detect nodes responsible to broadcast but failed to do so. Groups then
had to punish or exclude these misbehaving nodes. A better system would in-
centivize nodes to participate instead of only punish when misbehaving. Proper
incentives become even more important under stricter scrutiny, as misbehaving
nodes might refuse cooperation selectively or drag out processes unnecessarily,
leaving the true originator to forfeit their anonymity guarantees and start the
flooding themselves. Therefore, we designed a system where messages can only
be read when enough participants cooperate to cross a threshold, enforcing the
anonymity guarantees of the protocol throughout the network.
Our contribution is a novel system combining dining-cryptographers groups
and (n, k)-Shamir’s secret sharing. Our system prevents identification of the orig-
inator in the presence of up to k−1 attackers in the DC group for a given security
parameter k < n with a DC group size of n. Broadcasting the shares requires
at least k participants, leading to enforced k-anonymity during the broadcast.
Lastly, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and its evaluation.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we give an overview of
the basic building blocks and the background of this paper. We propose our k-
resistant solution to broadcast messages using a DC-protocol and Shamir’s secret
sharing in Section 3. We provide proof of our scheme’s security and privacy in
Section 4, while an evaluation of the performance of our scheme can be found in
Section 5. Lastly, in Section 6, we discuss possible applications of our scheme.
2 Background
In this section, we discuss the required background for this paper. First and
foremost, this encompasses the notation, scenario, and attacker model and the
algorithmic and mathematical concepts used in this paper, i.e., Chaum’s dining-
cryptographers protocol and Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme.
2.1 Notation and Scenario
For this paper, we will restrict the discussion to groups of nodes that interact as
peers, e.g., a peer-to-peer network. Hereby, the network is further segregated into
1 See https://gitlab.com/kovri-project/kovri.
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a group of n participants, who form a group G = g1, . . . , gn. Each participant gi
is identified by its index i.
Participants create various messages. The message a participant gi creates
and wants to broadcast is denoted by mi. Intermittent messages created to
be sent throughout the protocol by gi and received by gk are denoted as Mi.
Throughout the paper, we use ⊕ to denote the bitwise XOR.
The group has various requirements for their network communication. A
group needs pairwise authenticated connections between all nodes to prevent
network manipulation. Further, nodes need to be able to create a securely shared
secret between each pair of nodes. The assumptions are easily satisfied by modern
networks using mTLS and generally available cryptographic libraries.
2.2 Dining-cryptographers Protocol
Chaum’s dining-cryptographers protocol [3] allows a participant in a group to
broadcast a message with perfect sender anonymity. This means that an attacker
attempting to identify the sender of a message deducts that all non-colluding
participants have an equal probability of being the sender of the message.
Conceptually, the dining-cryptographers protocol performs a distributed com-
putation of the bitwise XOR function
⊕
i=1...n mi where each participant pro-
vides one input value mi. In case participant gk is sending a message mk and




mi = 0⊕ 0⊕ · · · ⊕mk ⊕ · · · ⊕ 0 = mk. (1)
To compute a bitwise XOR, and therefore hide the true sender, all messages
need to have the same length. This requirement can be lifted by application of
preparing communication steps as used by Dissent [13]. At most, one message is
allowed to be non-zero, otherwise, the resulting message mout would be the XOR
of all input messages and therefore unreadable. A node that does not intend to
send anything uses mi = 0 as an input message. The protocol as described in
Algorithm 1 is run by every node separately, broadcasting one message per-
protocol run.
Algorithm 1 Dining Cryptographer Protocol as executed by node gself .
Input: Participants g1, g2, . . . , gn, message mself of length ℓ
Output: Message mout =
⊕
k=1...n
mk which is the same across all participants
1: Establish shared random secrets sself,i of length ℓ with each member gi, i 6= self
2: Mself = mself ⊕
⊕
i=1...n,i6=self sself,i
3: Send Mself to gi ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n} \ {self}
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Please note, that all secrets si,j are symmetrical, i.e., si,j = sj,i, and are
shared between pairs of nodes gi, gj. The result mout =
⊕
i=1...n Mi contains
every index combination i 6= j exactly once. Therefore, all secret pairs si,j , sj,i
eliminate each other si,j ⊕ sj,i = 0.
Dining-cryptographers protocols are a well-known privacy-preserving primi-
tive for network communication. They are applied in small groups of nodes in
various modern protocols [1,4,11,13]. Dissent [4,13] applies them as its commu-
nication protocol in the core anonymity network. Von Ahn et al. [1] and also we,
in previous work [11], use them as group components to provide strong sender
anonymity. So their security properties are relevant for modern designs as well.
Using DC networks for implementing a broadcast will be very inefficient for
large groups. To mitigate this, a reasonably-sized sub-group could run a DC
protocol. Some of the members then start a flood-and-prune broadcast to reach
all other group members, e.g., as we laid out in [10]. However, care has to be
taken on how the flood-and-prune phase is started so that it does not reveal the
originator or the entire group composition.
2.3 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Lastly, we introduce Shamir’s secret sharing [12]. The scheme splits a message
into n shares so that k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n shares are required to reconstruct the
original message. This is often called a (n, k) threshold scheme.
Any polynomial f =
∑k−1
i=0 aix
i, ak−1 6= 0 of degree k − 1 is unambiguously
defined by any k points [5] and can be reconstructed from them. Given n distinct
points of f with ∀i 6= j : xi 6= xj , we can denote the set as:
{(x1, f(x1)), (x2, f(x2)), . . . , (xn, f(xn))}. (2)
The original polynomial can be recovered from any subset of points of size k.
Lagrange interpolation provides the formula to recover the original polynomial,
which works over the real numbers as well as over fields Zp, making all operations
over integers modulo p. This leads to the same result independent of the chosen











Given a message m ∈ Zp we now want to construct a polynomial f ∈ Zp[x],
the polynomial space over the given integers. The degree of f is deg(f) = k − 1
and f(0) = m. A polynomial can be constructed easily by choosing integers







It is easy to see that f(0) = m, as all other coefficients will be eliminated,
and it holds that the degree of f is k− 1. The required n secret shares can then
be computed as
si = (i, f(i)), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (6)
A Galois field GF(2n) of suitable size is used to implement Shamir’s secret
sharing efficiently, usually GF(28). A notable property of these fields is that the
addition of elements is equivalent to bitwise XOR of their binary representation.
2.4 Goal
Our honest peers’ goal is to broadcast a message within the network while main-
taining sender anonymity, i.e., at least k−1 other nodes should be indistinguish-
able from them as the originator, where k depends on the parameters chosen in
the system. Honest nodes will strictly follow the protocol, as their goal is to
broadcast messages correctly.
The primary goal of the attacker is to identify the participant sending the
message. Attackers follow the semi-honest model, i.e., they follow the protocol,
with a small modification: They are allowed to refuse cooperation in the flood
and prune broadcasting phase. They will combine all knowledge they can ac-
quire throughout the protocol, e.g., all messages they receive. Attackers cannot
manipulate the network, compromise other nodes, and solve computationally-
infeasible problems such as encryption schemes. The privacy section details ad-
ditional measures and their applicability with malicious attackers.
3 Secret-Shared Dining-Cryptographers Protocol
Within a large network, consider a group of size n, where one participant wants
to transmit a message into the entire network. We change the broadcast of the
message to all participants into the transmission of n distinct parts while still
using a dining-cryptographers broadcast. The parts are created using a (n, k)
Shamir’s secret-sharing technique. Each part is transmitted simultaneously dur-
ing a modified dining cryptographer round, resulting in each participant ending
up with a single share of the message. The values of k and p required for the
secret-sharing are system parameters, i.e., they are known beforehand and stay
the same in the whole system.
Our protocol consists of three phases, which are shown in Section 3. In the
first phase, named Split, a given message m is split into n secret shares. To split
the message, we chose k − 1 random numbers to create a random polynomial f
which evaluates as f(0) = m. Lastly we compute the secret shares si = (i, f(i)
mod p) for all i ∈ [1, n].
In the following phase (the distribution phase), each of the n participants
of the network then receives a unique share of the secret. As described above,
the DC protocol can only be used to make anonymous broadcasts, but not to
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Split (Step 1)
Distribute (Steps 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Broadcast and Combine (Step 7, 8)
Fig. 1. The three phases of the protocol and their corresponding steps explained in
Algorithm 2. A message gets split up into n shares, which are then distributed to group
members via a dining-cryptographers broadcast, one share for each. Any k members
can then cooperate and recover the original message, corresponding to the split phase.
send individual messages to certain participants anonymously. We can modify
the protocol in such a way that this becomes possible. The modified DC protocol
version is shown in Algorithm 2, note that a node that does not intend to send
anything still proceeds with mself = 0. Further note that paricipants not part of
the group just execute Step 8 of Algorithm 2. The key modification compared
to the original DC protocol as described by Chaum [3] (shown in Algorithm 1)
is that Step 3 no longer makes a broadcast but transmits individual messages to
other participants. The impact of this change is discussed in Section 4.
Algorithm 2 Modified DC protocol as executed by node gself .
Input: Participants g1, g2, . . . , gn, message mself of length ℓ
Output: Message mself,out, the message transmitted to this entity
1: Split mself into n parts mself,1, . . . ,mself,n using the secret-sharing scheme
2: Establish shared random secrets sself,i of length ℓ with each member gi, i 6= self
3: Mself,i = mself,i ⊕
⊕
j=1...n,j 6=self sself,j ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n}
4: Send Mself,i to gi ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n} \ {self}




7: Broadcast mself,out to all network participants
8: Reconstruct mout after receiving k − 1 other shares
The output of the distributed XOR function that participant gh computes is
no longer mout =
⊕
i=1...n mi but rather mh,out =
⊕
i=1...n mi,h. Each member
must now broadcast the message throughout the network.
If at least k participants broadcast their message, every recipient can decode
the original message. If k−2 or fewer participants broadcast the message, no one
can decode the message. When exactly k − 1 participants broadcast, only non-
broadcasting participants of the group can decode the message, as they possess
the last share required to decrypt the message themself. Verifying the correctness
of the result is omitted for the simplicity of the presentation. It would require
application-level integrity protection, i.e., there needs to be a way to ensure a
message is valid for the application using the protocol.
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3.1 Correctness
For the protocol’s correctness, we assume all participants execute the DC pro-
tocol correctly, no errors occurred, and everyone used a (n, k) Shamir’s secret
sharing technique. In a first step, we show that participants can reconstruct the
sum of all Shamir’s secret sharing points from the messages received in the DC
protocol. From this, we reconstruct the original message mi 6= 0 in a second
step, given a successful sharing round.
Recovering the Sum of All Shared Points The i-th participant receives the
n − 1 messages M1,i . . .Mi−1,iMi+1,i . . .Mn,i. Further, they create the message
Mi,i themselves. Each message has the form:



















































As mh,i was created through the Shamir’s secret sharing protocol, they have
the form mh,i = ph(i). Here ph is the polynomial created by participant h to
split their message. The polynomial is created over the Galois field GF(28), a
field with characteristic 2. In fields of characteristic 2, XOR and addition are












Reconstruction of the Shared Message In this second step, we show that
receiving k distinct results allows us to reconstruct the protocol’s original mes-
sage input. We assume that the flooding mechanism, or any appropriate sharing
protocol, correctly distributed k shares to all participants. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume a participant received the first k messages:
∑
h∈{1...n}
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We saw in the section on Lagrange interpolation, that polynomial interpola-
tion is uniquely possible with k evaluation points p(1), . . . , p(k) for a polynomial






Polynomial interpolation is unique with the given degree restrictions, and






Evaluation and addition is commutative for polynomials, i.e., (f + g)(x) =


















If at most one message mi 6= 0 exists, the reconstruction of the message is
successful. Otherwise, the sum of all non-zero messages is restored.
4 Security and Privacy Evaluation
We assume a group size of n participants using a secure (n, k)-secret sharing
scheme for this evaluation. We restrict ourselves to group communication, as the
flood and prune broadcast has no interesting privacy or security properties.
4.1 Goal
Let Mi = (Mi,1, . . . ,Mi,n) be the vector of messages created by node i in a sys-
tem with n participants. Let f be the function combining such a vector into the
intended message, i.e., the combination algorithm of the secret sharing scheme.
Within the formalisation, we denote the previously presented Algorithm 2 as
Alg2, which is used to create all messages Mi,j . Let the probability of k − 1










pp← Setup(λ, k, f)
Mi := Mi,j, i, j ∈ {1 . . . n} ← Alg2(pp)




We call our scheme (n, k − 1) secure if this probability is only negligibly














Informally, this definition is true when k− 1 colluding nodes cannot identify
the originator of the message within the set of n − |attackers| non-colluding
nodes. But once k nodes cooperate, no guarantees are made.
4.2 Semi-Honest Model
To show our scheme fulfills the previous definition, let there be k − 1 colluding
attackers present in the group, which follow the semi-honest model. Assume,
without loss of generality as the nodes can be renumbered, that the victim has
index 1 and the attackers’ index 2 through k.
These colluding participants can collect k − 1 messages Mi,j of the form
Mi,j = mi,j ⊕
⊕
h∈{1...n} si,h by any participant i and the honest reconstruction
of p∑, which provides the transmitted message m and the sum of all point
evaluations. To identify the originator, the attackers need to compute any m1,j
of the victim or, equivalently, their aggregate key
⊕
j s1,j . The original proof of
Chaum holds for directly reconstructing
⊕
j s1,j , so we will focus on m1,j. Note
that m1,j = p1(j) is equivalent, where the polynomial p1 has degree deg(pi) =












































As XOR and addition are equivalent over base fields of characteristic 2, which
we use, and that mi,j = pi(j), we can see that
m1,i ⊕m1,j = p1(i) + p1(j). (18)
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Note that this only holds for even combinations, i.e., we cannot create p1(2)+
p1(3)+p1(4). All combinations with an even number of parts can be constructed
as a linear combination of combinations of two parts. Therefore, using this equa-











i=1 2ai(k − 1)
i−1ki−1 = p1(k − 1) + p1(k)
(19)
The attackers can reconstruct the transmitted message m = p∑(0) by fol-




pj = p1 +
n∑
j=k+1
pj =: premains. (20)
Using this and applying the strategy to compute [p1] on all non-colluding
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All entries [pi] represent the previous equation systems with their respective
solution vectors Si = (pi(2) + pi(3), . . . , pi(k − 1) + pi(k)) generated from the
messagesMi,j . Each block [pi] and [0] have k−2 rows, while the final row models
premains, where all coefficients are present exactly once. All further derivations
of premains would not be linearly independent equations. There is no further
relation between the remaining polynomials p1, pk+1, . . . , pn, as all are chosen
independently at random.
Solving the equations for a single participant leaves us with k − 2 + 1 rows
([pi] and premains) and k indeterminants a1, . . . , ak and therefore k columns. The
full matrix has (n− k + 1)× (k − 2) + 1 rows and k × (n− k + 1) + 1 columns.
Using the Rouché–Capelli theorem, i.e., if for a system of equations Ax = b
there is a unique solution iff rank(A) = rank(A|b), this results in infinitely
many solutions, i.e., ambiguous reconstruction, and further breaks the security
assumption of the base secret sharing protocol.
If a message can be verified after decryption, an exhaustive search for solu-
tions is possible. The underlying field size determines the cost for an exhaustive
search, i.e., the field size corresponds to λ in our previous definition. Absent any
notes identifying correct solutions, all solutions to the system of equations are
equally valid and likely, i.e., any of the n− k + 1 possible victims might be the





Outside observers cannot determine the origin of a broadcast as long as secure
channels are used, as all participants have to send data of the same size for each
transmission. Similar to classical DC networks, no guarantees can be retained
when the channels are no longer secure.
4.4 Modern DC Malicious Mitigations
While attackers act semi-honest in the previous evaluation, modern dining-
cryptographers protocols apply various mechanisms to deal with collisions, fair-
ness, and robustness issues of the protocol [1, 6]. 2n slots are used to increase
fairness, where every participant may use at most one slot at a time, which they
chose randomly. For each secret share, a commitment is created and broadcasted
to the group. A zero-knowledge proof is used when more than half of all slots are
used. The proof shows that a participant used at most one slot. Lastly, the most
problematic case, selective non-participation, can be combated by pre-emptively
sharing all secrets in encrypted form with the group.
These techniques can be applied to our proposed protocol to make it resistant
to malicious participants. Slots can be easily introduced by applying the secret
splitting per slot, not on the full message. Commitments can be created in the
same form as by von Ahn et al. [1]: each slot provides its own commitments. The
zero-knowledge proof of fairness by von Ahn et al. can be extended as easily:
The opening of commitments is combined with a reconstruction of the secret
shares into the actual message. This message has to be zero.
5 Performance Evaluation
This section shows the performance results for our scheme and the methodology
used to acquire those results.
5.1 Methodology
We implemented a prototype simulation that can simulate both the original
DC protocol and our modified version. The simulation is available online2 and
written in Java. We use built-in synchronization utilities to model the communi-
cation and synchronization of participants. For threshold cryptography, we used
the open-source library shamir3 in version 0.7.0. The Shamir library uses a Ga-
lois field GF(28) as a base field. The library provides two methods, split and
join, of combined complexity of O(ℓ · (n+ k2)).
We ran this implementation 10 to 30 times for each combination of param-
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Network latency is simulated, but we set it to 0 to prevent influence on the
measured variable when not specified. To mitigate our results’ distortion due to
runtime optimization attempts by the Java virtual machine, we ran a warm-up
phase before each test. In this warm-up phase, 100 runs were performed that are
not included in our results.
We compared the modified DC protocol, denoted as Broadcast, to Chaum’s
original version’s performance, denoted as DC Phase in graphs. We investigated
several core issues:
– The size ℓ of the transmitted message,
– the scaling behaviour of the protocol, i.e., increasing n,
– the performance impact of variable k values,
– the influence of network latency.
For the performance evaluation, we consider a simple collaboration protocol
in place of the broadcast to reduce simulation effort. Participants collaborate
with at least k−1 other members to recover the original messagem. Algorithm 3
provides a cooperation scheme which, when executed correctly by each network
member, produces a minimal amount of transmitted messages: n(k − 1).
Algorithm 3 Combine protocol to emulate broadcast.
Input: Message part mi :=
⊕
j
mj,i, Group members g1, g2, . . . , gn, number of re-
quired message shares k
Output: Message mout
1: Send mi to gj ∀j ∈ {i+ a mod (n+ 1) | a ∈ N, 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1}
2: Receive mr from gr∀r ∈ {x | ∃a, 1 ≤ a ≤ k − 1 : x+ a mod (n+ 1) = i}
3: return mout from the k − 1 received messages and mi.
We opted not to evaluate a full flooding approach, as this would shift the
focus from the modifications we performed. Additionally, the performance char-
acteristics of flooding approaches are well known.
5.2 Message Size ℓ
Both the original DC protocol and our modified protocol transmit a message
of the fixed-length ℓ each round. We want to keep ℓ as close as possible to the
actual length of the information we want to send.
Messages longer than ℓ can be split into multiple messages, increasing over-
head and, therefore, decreasing throughput. If the information is shorter than ℓ,
it can be padded with 0-bytes to make it size ℓ, leading to the transmission of
more data than necessary, producing overhead as well.
We show the results of this overhead in Figure 2. We varied ℓ from 32B to
32 kB with n = 10 and a given real message size of 8 kB. We chose the relevant
parameters for this benchmark with regard to the potential use for our proposed
system in the field of cryptocurrencies. Therefore we picked sizes applicable to
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groups [11] and transaction sizes, validating our assumption that the perfor-
mance is at its peak when ℓ is roughly equal to the size of the information to
























Fig. 2. The measured throughput and its standard deviation while increasing ℓ for
n = 10 and k = 3. The transmitted information has size 8 kB. Performance reaches its
peak when ℓ is about the size of the transmitted information.
5.3 Network Size n
While the message complexity for the core DC protocol is identical in both
schemes, a round of the modified version of the DC protocol needs additional
messages in the cooperation phase. When keeping k constant, the modified ver-
sion of the protocol requires O(n) more transmissions than the original protocol.
As we see in Figure 3a, this makes a significant difference for a low number of
participants. Because both versions of the protocol are of overall complexity
O(n2), the linear performance penalty becomes less of a concern when n grows
larger.
The increased number of sent messages is only one reason for the worse
performance of our system. The time for performing one round of the protocol
can be divided into two parts: time spent communicating and time spent for
calculations. Our system requires a larger amount of computations compared to
the classical DC protocol. In addition to performing the core DC functionality,
it also splits and joins the messages to transmit using a secret-sharing scheme,
resulting in the strong performance difference seen in Figure 3a.
5.4 Network Delay
To investigate less optimal environments, we simulated our scheme using a delay
of > 0ms. The gap in performance between the original DC protocol and our
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system is notably smaller. The results of adding a delay of 100ms are shown
in Figure 3b respectively, but simulations with intermediate values show similar
results. We chose 100ms as a typical representation of internet communication
delay, but in real-world scenarios, it can be considerably smaller.









































Fig. 3. Measuring throughput in DC protocol runs over networks of various sizes.
Variable n, k = 3, ℓ =8kB.
Note that when adding delay, our system only improves relative to the
original dining-cryptographers protocol. The absolute performance of both ap-
proaches suffers under message transmission delay. We measured throughput
rates of 13.58kB/s for n = 4 and 9.12kB/s for n = 10 with a delay of 100ms.
5.5 Number of Shares k
Lastly, the value of k is the number of message shares needed to restore a message
and significantly impacts the protocol. This impact is due to participants needing
to compute additional methods and perform additional k − 1 transmissions to
receive the shares. Figure 4 shows the results of benchmarking our system with
n = 10, ℓ = 8kB and k ∈ {3, . . . , 10}. As expected, increasing k decreases our
system’s performance.
6 Applications
As we have seen, our version of a DC protocol typically achieves throughput
rates between 10 kB/s and 100 kB/s. A real-world application for our system lies
in the anonymous transmission of transaction data for blockchains, e.g., in an
environment like the one proposed in [11]. Such transaction data are typically of
size < 1 kB, whereas group sizes are between n = 4 and n = 10 and transmission
delay is around 100ms.
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Fig. 4. Measuring network throughput while varying parameter k. The other param-
eters are kept constant with n = 10 and ℓ as well as the size of the transmitted
information as 8 kB.
Many blockchain systems produce only a few transactions per second, despite
thousands of nodes participating in the network. Separating these into groups for
privacy is unlikely to lead to any groups that require more than one transaction
per second. Therefore, every system that can achieve speeds of > 1 transactions
made per second is suitable for application in a system as the one proposed
in [11]. Our system is well-suited for such a task, as it can efficiently work with
this load.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a combination of the classical dining-cryptographers
protocol and Shamir’s secret sharing to enforce anonymity during a broadcast
process. This problem arises during a broadcast, as nodes that already received
the message might refuse further cooperation. We showed that the protocol is
computational secure in the number of shares k, maintaining n − |attackers|-
anonymity for at most k − 1 attackers.
Our system provides a first, unoptimized solution, so further work could im-
prove the system’s performance and flexibility. In our simulation, this results in
throughput rates between 10 kB/s and 100kB/s for a full broadcast simulation
and over 500kB/s with reasonable privacy settings. These performance results
show our system is viable for a wide range of applications, such as blockchain-
transaction dissemination in peer-to-peer networks and other peer-to-peer ap-
plications requiring high privacy guarantees.
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